International arbitration is a world of multiple interfaces among legal orders, marked by significant tensions at specific pressure points. It is the purpose of much, if not most scholarship in international arbitration to seek to resolve such tensions. In this article the author deals with a set of pressure points that has recently been brought to the surface in a particularly comprehensive and systemic manner, in the context of the Restatement of the US Law of International Commercial Arbitration: the clash between, on the one hand, the New York Convention and thus the international model of international arbitration and, on the other hand, the basic US federal legislation on international commercial arbitration and thus the US model on international arbitration. This clash, the author shows, becomes manifest with regard to issues including: awards made in the United States but whose enforcement is nevertheless governed by the New York Convention; the preclusive effects for other courts of a court's decision on the scope of an arbitration agreement; the common law notion of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion-preclusive effects for other courts and tribunals of factual and legal findings) as opposed to the Convention's focus on res judicata (claim preclusion); the application of forum non conveniens in actions to enforce an award; treating interim measures as awards; and the role of state public policy as opposed to federal public policy.
Introduction
Much as one may try to universalize and even 'de-nationalize' international commercial arbitration-whether through Conventions, uniform or model laws, or soft law-the phenomenon remains profoundly affected by national law and policy. The incongruities-big and smallbetween domestic and international arbitration regimes typically present themselves on a purely ad hoc basis, that is to say, in specific and often isolated contexts, as when a particular case in national court produces a result that looks anomalous from the point of view of a major This is so for three basic reasons. First, few commercially significant countries can compete with the United States for the world title of international law exceptionalism. If any State were poised to disrupt the simple and sleek view of international arbitration held dear in many international arbitration circles, it is the United States.
Second, a Restatement of US law in any given field comes around only rarely, and it has only just now come around-for the first time-for international commercial arbitration. (Two of the Restatement's six chapters have at this time been finalized and approved.) By its nature, a Restatement reexamines a field in a fashion that is both comprehensive, on the one hand, and detailed and focused, on the other. A Restatement of the US Law of International Commercial Arbitration can thus reveal on a large scale, but at the same time with great specificity, the tensions between international arbitration as viewed nationally and internationally.
It is helpful to recall that Restatements began over 80 years ago in the United States for the purpose of fostering clarity, consistency and coherence in the fields of law most apparently in need of them. Unsurprisingly, the initial fields subject to Restatement were ones not only of state rather than federal law, but also ones characteristically taking common law rather than statutory form. Against that background, when a federal law subject (like international commercial arbitration) that is governed by federal statute (again like international commercial arbitration) becomes the subject of a Restatement, that is a sure sign that help is needed.
This circumstance may in turn be explained by the combination of legal sources on which this particular Restatement draws: viz., a domestic statute that long predates the New York Convention and a vast case law interpreting the Convention chiefly on the basis of interstate rather than international cases. The United States stands in a position very different from the many jurisdictions having modern international commercial arbitration legislation, particularly those that have adopted UNCITRAL's own Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which aimed to minimize, if not eliminate, all contradictions between the New York Convention and the local lex arbitri.
Third, this moment is further apt for gauging the 'fit' between US and international models of international commercial arbitration, since the New York Convention is itself the subject both of proposals for comprehensive reform and of what may fairly be called 'Restatement'-type activity. As regards the latter, UNCITRAL has recently commissioned an 'UNCITRAL Guide to the New York Convention', whose purpose is to expose and, hopefully, mitigate divergent interpretations of the Convention by national courts around the world. This is a problem that all international treaty regimes face if they lack their own designated international tribunal charged with establishing the treaty's authoritative interpretation, and it prevents a risk that UNCITRAL is seeking to mitigate.
A Taxonomy of Tensions
Because the Restatement project is still young, it would ordinarily be too early to reach conclusions about the tensions between the US law of international commercial arbitration, on the one hand, and the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law, on the other. However, for completely unrelated reasons, work on this Restatement began with the chapter on recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards, which is of course the prime subject of the New York Convention. This circumstance has enabled us to identify the discontinuities much earlier in the life of the project than one might have imagined.
The tensions that have thus far emerged fall into four main categories: (i) The drafters of the Restatement identified three remaining possibilities. The first was to subject non-Convention awards to a judge-made general federal common law rule on recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. However, the subject-recognition and enforcement of foreign awards-does not present the obvious overriding federal interest generally required in order to justify creation of a federal common law.
The second was to subject them to the award recognition and enforcement law of the relevant US state. But state law on the subject, which might take either statutory or common law form, varies from state to state. This solution would comport poorly with the fundamental purpose of the FAA, which was to adopt a single broadly pro-arbitration set of principles at the federal level. In the end, the Restatement opted for foreign non-Convention awards to be governed by the same principles and rules established by FAA Chapter One for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in interstate commerce (as well as state arbitration law to the extent consistent with FAA Chapter One).
(ii) Convention awards made in the United States
The United States not only imposed a reciprocity requirement under the Convention; it also, acting very much alone among Contracting States, accepted the Convention's invitation to ratifying States to declare unilaterally that they will consider as Convention awards those awards that, while rendered on national territory, bear a reasonable relationship with a foreign country and might therefore be regarded as 'non-domestic'. The FAA implementing legislation accordingly provides for the Convention to govern recognition and enforcement of awards arising out of a relationship that involves a party that is not a citizen of American law traditionally gives wide scope to the notion of waiver.
Absent compelling circumstances, parties are free to waive the rights that they otherwise enjoy, and may do so either expressly or impliedly, as through conduct. Accordingly, courts are generally quick to find that parties have waived their procedural objections to the way an arbitration is conducted if they fail to raise the objection on a timely basis before the arbitral tribunal. Similarly, parties waive most of the Convention grounds for defeating recognition or enforcement by failing to raise them by way of defense on a timely basis in the enforcement action. This does not mean that waiver knows no limits under US law. For example, the Restatement does not consider that a party has waived the Convention's grounds for defeating recognition or enforcement on account of its failure-deliberate or otherwise-to bring a local annulment action against the award. On the other hand, if a party does bring an annulment action, and fails to raise a particular ground in support of its action to annul, it may be barred from raising that ground in the context of a later enforcement action.
(iii) Preclusion
Third, and more generally, US law recognizes that many objections to the recognition or enforcement of awards may plausibly be raised at earlier stages in the life-cycle of an arbitration. For example, a party may at the outset resist a court's compelling arbitration, on the ground that the dispute does not fall within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. If the court disagrees, arbitration then takes place and an award is rendered, that same party may seek annulment of the award, again on the ground that the dispute falls outside the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. This attempt will in principle be made before a court of the place of arbitration, often a court other than the one that compelled arbitration in the first place. If that attempt too is unsuccessful, the award may then be brought for enforcement to a court of a third jurisdiction (a jurisdiction where assets of the respondent may be found) and the respondent may now seek to defeat enforcement on essentially the same ground, namely that the dispute falls outside the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.
The question arises whether a court's judgment on the 'scope of arbitration' issue should be deemed to bind another court before which essentially the same question is raised at a later point in time? Considerations of judicial economy suggest a positive answer to that question. On the other hand, it may be thought that the scope issue is so fundamental to the legitimacy of the arbitration and the award that each of these courts should determine the question independently. The same situation may arise in connection with certain other grounds for non-recognition and non-enforcement under the Convention.
Strong arguments may be made in favour of authorizing, and even requiring, courts at each of these stages to examine and decide the issue independently. Effectiveness of the Convention's grounds for denying recognition and enforcement would clearly be enhanced by authorizing de novo consideration at each stage. But preclusion is deeply embedded in the practice of US litigation. The Restatement takes the position that judgments on these issues, whether rendered by a local or a foreign court, should be given the same preclusive effect that prior judgments generally enjoy under the forum's judgment recognition policies. This practice not only exemplifies the influence of domestic procedure on the enforcement of Convention rights and obligations. It also exemplifies a larger US emphasis on economy in litigation that is the subject of the third category of tensions described in Section C below. preclusive effect. These requirements, whose purpose is basically to ensure that a party's reasonable expectations concerning the binding effect of judgments in other cases will be met and that there will not be, for any reason, unfair surprise, would apply equally to awards, and may even be more difficult to meet. The Restatement's attempt to accommodate the Convention to peculiarities of US procedure on this subject was among its most challenging and controversial.
(v) Grounds for declining jurisdiction
Article III of the New York Convention directs States to accord recognition and enforcement to Convention awards 'in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon'. The
Convention's embrace of domestic civil procedure in recognition and enforcement actions is generally unproblematic. Courts in Convention
States may freely apply to such actions the same pleading, hearing and evidentiary regimes that govern the conduct of civil and commercial litigation generally. They may also freely determine the limitations period applicable to such actions, provided it is not unreasonably short. However, application of other broadly procedural ground rules has the potential to complicate and possibly adversely affect enforcement of Convention awards in the United States. Among the most contentious are rules allowing courts to decline jurisdiction.
Virtually all States place general limitations on the right of its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries. Unless one reads the Convention as impliedly doing away with any such discipline on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by domestic courts over non-nationals, the personal jurisdiction rules of the place where recognition or enforcement is sought should continue to apply as usual. That seems to be a common assumption.
More problematic is the applicability of domestic law limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, such as lis pendens and forum non conveniens. The former rarely presents a problem in the United States, since US courts, unlike courts in the European Union, do not regard themselves as obligated to decline jurisdiction on lis pendens grounds. By contrast, dismissals or stays on forum non conveniens grounds are highly common in international litigation. Although actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards seldom present the degree of inconvenience generally required for application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, US courts do entertain such motions and have on occasion granted them.
It has been suggested that forum non conveniens is just another domestic procedural rule that Article III of the Convention invites courts to apply in actions to enforce Convention awards. Under that view, a court may in its discretion refuse to hear a case that it is competent to hear. However, staying or dismissing an action to enforce a Convention award on convenience grounds stands in obvious tension with the international obligations that the New York Convention sought to impose.
The Restatement accordingly excludes all application of forum non conveniens to arbitral awards that are subject to the Convention.
C. Economy and Efficacy Interests
Several of the procedural features discussed in the previous section-such as waiver and preclusion-have as their basic purpose promoting economy and efficiency in dispute resolution, be it litigation or arbitration. To that extent they represent more than neutral procedural 'overlays'. They could just as easily be included in a third category of American law features, namely those specifically driven by economy and efficiency concerns. The Restatement, though still in its early stages, already reveals a significant number of such provisions. However, the real reason for treating arbitral interim measures as awards is not a conceptual but rather a practical one, viz. to strengthen the enforceability of such measures, and thereby the efficacy of arbitration.
(US law does not offer a firm basis for the immediate enforcement of interim measures-as opposed to judgments-issued by foreign courts.) Doing so will of course impose certain costs. One of them is the difficulty of drawing the line between arbitral procedural orders (which are not awards) and interim orders (which would be). Another is the opportunity that treating arbitral interim measures as awards opens up for parties to seek their annulment, thereby complicating and delaying progress of the arbitration. Still, the benefits of enabling interim measures to be immediately enforced have prevailed. arbitration and that the tribunal may well have been better placed to make than a reviewing court would be. For example, if, in deciding whether a party received adequate notice of proceedings, a court must determine the moment at which notice was given, the court may consider it appropriate to give weight to an arbitral finding on that issue, particularly if the tribunal heard conflicting live witness testimony on the matter. The availability or unavailability of a Convention defense to recognition and enforcement will not often depend on such testimony-based factual conclusions. But if and when they do, it may serve economy and efficiency for the arbitral finding of fact to be shown a measure of deference.
(iii) Determining the scope of the agreement to arbitrate
Relatedly, the parties may have expressly given the arbitrators final authority to determine whether a given dispute falls within the scope of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Again, US courts in principle determine independently whether a party seeking to defeat recognition or enforcement of an award has established the circumstances necessary for such a defense. However, this particular ground for non-recognition or non-enforcement squarely entails contract interpretation, an exercise on which arbitral tribunals are generally meant to have the final word, and it may be more efficient for courts to give weight to the arbitrators' determination of the scope and breadth of the agreement to arbitrate. Consequently, the Restatement, much like the case law generally, permits the parties to shift ultimate authority on the 'scope' question to the arbitral tribunal, provided the parties do so clearly and unmistakably.
(iv) Anti-suit injunctions
Considerations of economy and efficiency will undoubtedly figure even more prominently in the chapters of the Restatement that lie ahead. For example, the Restatement is bound to give serious consideration to the availability of judicial anti-suit injunctions in support of orders referring the parties to arbitration, which will be among the subjects treated in Chapter Two of the Restatement. Though objectionable in some respects, their availability would enhance the effectiveness of a court order that merely refers parties to arbitration. Considerations of economy and efficiency are also likely to influence the Restatement's positions on various aspects of the arbitral process, the subject of Restatement Chapter Three.
D. American Federalism
There remains as a source of tensions the quintessentially US law problem of federalism. This should occasion no surprise, given the fundamental role of state courts in the administration of justice in the United States. But the significance of state law, as shown further below, is sometimes a great deal more than jurisdictional.
(i) State and Federal Court Jurisdiction
In the US judicial system, state courts have jurisdiction over many, indeed most, claims arising under federal law. Actions for the enforcement of principle, the US states are entitled to have and to enforce their own public policy insofar as it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy. It is true that restricting public policy within the meaning of the Convention to policy articulated at the federal level would narrow the scope of the exception, while enhancing uniformity and predictability in the recognition and enforcement of awards. However, that benefit would come at a significant cost to maintaining the federalism balance within the United States. Precisely for that reason the Restatement allows state public policy to occupy a place in the analysis, though only under very restricted circumstances.
Conclusion
International agreements never translate perfectly into the national legal orders of States, and agreements on an inherently international law subject such as international commercial arbitration are no exception.
The current elaboration of a Restatement of the US Law of International Commercial Arbitration is providing a rare opportunity to observe such discontinuities comprehensively and in detail. These discontinuities, which stem from a wide range of national peculiarities, differ considerably in the extent to which they affect the workings of the New York Convention in the United States. It is possible, however, to discern certain patterns and thereby identify what may be the underlying sources of tension.
A factor of capital importance is the FAA itself, notwithstanding the fact that it was amended specifically in order to give effect to the New York as 'Domesticating' the New York Convention: the Impact of the Federal Arbit... http://jids.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/2/317.full#xref-fn-7-1
That, however, is not the point. The point, rather, is to appreciate how much room there is for differential application at the national level even of a treaty as widely ratified and as apparently successful as the New York Convention. These disparities matter all the more, given the interdependence among legal systems that international commercial arbitration entails and the very high expectations that the New York Convention itself has created. ↵ 21 Restatement, s 5-17 (c): 'A party ordinarily does not waive a particular objection merely by failing to bring a timely action in a competent court to stay the arbitration or by failing to seek set aside of the award in a competent court. However, to the extent that the relevant facts underlying an objection were known or should have been known to a party at the time that judicial proceedings related to the arbitration were actually brought and conducted, the party waives that objection if it fails to raise it in any such proceedings'. 
